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We analyze the relationship between partisanship, echo chambers, and 
vulnerability to online misinformation by studying news sharing 
behavior on Twitter. While our results confirm prior findings that online 
misinformation sharing is strongly correlated with right-leaning 
partisanship, we also uncover a similar, though weaker trend among 
left-leaning users. Because of the correlation between a user’s 
partisanship and their position within a partisan echo chamber, these 
types of influence are confounded. To disentangle their effects, we 
perform a regression analysis and find that vulnerability to 
misinformation is most strongly influenced by partisanship for both 
left- and right-leaning users. 
 
Research questions 
 
● Is exposure to more partisan news associated with increased vulnerability to misinformation? 
● Are conservatives more vulnerable to misinformation than liberals? 
● Are users in a structural echo chamber (highly clustered community within the online 
information diffusion network) more likely to share misinformation? 
● Are users in a content echo chamber (where social connections are exposed to similar news) 
more likely to share misinformation? 
 
Essay summary 
 
● We investigated the relationship between political partisanship, echo chambers, and 
vulnerability to misinformation by analyzing news articles shared by over 15,000 Twitter 
accounts in June 2017. 
● We quantified political partisanship based on the political valence of the news sources 
consumed by each user. 
2 
● We quantified the extent to which a user is in an echo chamber by two different methods: 
(1) the similarity of the content they shared to that of their friends, and (2) the level of 
clustering of users in their follower network. 
● We quantified the vulnerability to misinformation based on the fraction of links a user shares 
from sites known to produce low-quality content. 
● Our findings suggest that political partisanship, echo chambers, and vulnerability to 
misinformation are highly correlated. The effects of echo chambers and political partisanship on 
vulnerability to misinformation are confounded, but a stronger link can be established between 
partisanship and misinformation. 
● The findings suggest that social media platforms can combat the spread of misinformation by 
prioritizing more diverse, less polarized content. 
Implications 
Two years since the call for a systematic “science of fake news” to study the vulnerabilities of 
individuals, institutions, and society to manipulation by malicious actors (Lazer et al., 2018), the 
response of the research community has been robust. However, the answers provided by the growing 
body of studies on misinformation are not simple. They paint a picture in which a complex system of 
ingredients — cognitive, social, and algorithmic biases, as well as abuse — interact to give rise to the 
patterns of misinformation spread, exposure, and impact that we observe in the information ecosystem. 
Misinformation spreading is a process involving different classes of actors (information producers, 
consumers, and intermediaries) with different goals, incentives, capabilities, and biases (Ruths, 2019). 
Not only are individuals and organizations hard to model, but even if we could explain individual actions, 
we would not be able to easily predict collective behaviors, such as the impact of a disinformation 
campaign, due to the large, complex, and dynamic networks of interactions enabled by social media.  
Despite the difficulties in modeling the spread of misinformation, several key findings have emerged. 
Regarding exposure, when one considers news articles that have been fact-checked, false reports spread 
more virally than real news (Vosoughi at al., 2018). Despite this, a relatively small portion of voters was 
exposed to misinformation during the 2016 US presidential election (Grinberg et al., 2019). This 
conclusion was based on the assumption that all posts by friends are equally likely to be seen. However, 
since social media platforms rank content based on popularity and personalization (Nikolov et al., 2018), 
highly-engaging false news would get higher exposure. The effect of algorithmic bias on exposure to 
low-quality content is a complex one (Ciampaglia et al., 2018). 
Other vulnerabilities to misinformation stem from cognitive biases such as lack of reasoning (Pennycook 
& Rand, 2019) and preference for novel content (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Competition for our finite 
attention has also been shown to play a key role in content virality (Weng et al., 2012).  
Misinformation spread can also be the result of manipulation. Social bots (Ferrara et al., 2016; Varol et 
al., 2017) can be designed to to target vulnerable communities (Shao, Hui et al., 2018; Yan et al., 2020) 
and exploit human and algorithmic biases that favor engaging content (Ciampaglia et al., 2018; Avram et 
al., 2020), leading to an amplification of exposure (Shao, Ciampaglia et al., 2018).  
Finally, the polarized and segregated structure of political communication in online social networks 
(Conover et al., 2011) implies that information spreads efficiently among people who are most 
vulnerable (Conover et al., 2012) and that users are shielded by diverse perspectives, including fact-
checking sources (Shao, Hui et al., 2018). Models suggest that homogeneity and polarization are 
important factors in the spread of misinformation (Del Vicario et al., 2016).  
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While prior research highlighted a correlation between misinformation sharing and conservative 
political beliefs (Grinberg et al., 2019), we find that liberal partisans are also vulnerable. However, 
further work is necessary to understand the nature of the relationship between partisanship and 
vulnerability to misinformation. Are the two mutually reinforcing, or does one stem from the other? The 
answer to this question can inform how social media platforms prioritize interventions such as fact-
checking of articles, reining in extremist groups spreading misinformation, and changing their algorithms 
to provide exposure to more diverse content on news feeds. 
The present findings reinforce a view of the misinformation ecosystem as a complex network in which 
multiple types of actors have non-trivial cognitive biases and vulnerabilities. Online social interactions 
among them lead to emerging community and virality patterns that are hard to predict. And adversaries 
can effectively use frictionless automation to penetrate and manipulate the network while maintaining 
anonymity, creating a third layer of non-linear interactions. Funding agencies will have to support long-
term research collaborations among cognitive, social, computer, and complex systems scientists if we 
are to overcome the challenges of online misinformation. 
Findings 
We want to test the hypothesis that partisanship, echo chambers, and the vulnerability to 
misinformation are related phenomena. We define a Twitter user’s vulnerability to misinformation by 
the fraction of their shared links that are from a list of low-quality sources. Consistent with past research 
(Grinberg et al., 2019), we observe that vulnerability to misinformation is strongly correlated with 
partisanship in right-leaning users. However, unlike past work, we find a similar effect for left-leaning 
users (Figure 1a). Overall, we observe that right-leaning users are slightly more likely to be partisan and 
to be vulnerable to misinformation. The great majority of users on both sides of the political spectrum 
have misinformation scores below 0.5, indicating that those who share misinformation also share a lot 
of other types of content. In addition, we observe a moderate relationship between vulnerability to 
misinformation and two measures that capture the extent to which a user is in an echo chamber: the 
similarity among sources of links shared by the user and their friends (Figure 1b) and the clustering in 
the user’s follower network (Figure 1c). 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between misinformation and other variables. (a) Partisanship: the Pearson 
correlation is r=0.65 for left-leaning users and r=0.69 for right-leaning users. (b) Similarity: r=0.33. 
(c) Clustering: r=0.31. 
 
In Figure 2 we show that the three independent variables we analyze (partisanship, similarity, and 
clustering) are actually correlated with each other. User similarity and clustering are moderately 
correlated, as we might expect given that they both aim to capture the notion of embeddedness within 
an online echo chamber. Partisanship is moderately correlated to both echo chamber quantities. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between independent variables. (a) Partisanship and similarity: Pearson 
correlation r=0.45 for left-leaning users and r=0.42 for right-leaning users. (b) Partisanship and 
clustering: r=0.21 for left-learning users and r=0.19 for right-leaning users. (c) Similarity and clustering: 
r=0.40. 
 
Given these correlations, we wish to disentangle the effect of partisanship and echo chambers on 
vulnerability to misinformation. To this end, we conducted a regression analysis using vulnerability to 
misinformation as the dependent variable. The results are summarized in Table 1. We see that all 
independent variables except clustering for left-leaning users significantly affect the dependent variable 
(p<0.01). However, as shown by the coefficients and the adjusted increases in R2, the effect is much 
stronger for partisanship. 
 
Variable Left-leaning Users (Adjusted R2 = 0.43) Right-leaning Users (Adjusted R2 = 0.48) 
Coefficient p Adj. R2 
increase 
Coefficient p Adj. R2 
increase 
Partisanship 
(b1) 
0.451 0.001 0.3 0.640 0.001 0.4 
Similarity 
(b2) 
0.046 0.001 0.003 0.031 0.004 0.001 
Clustering 
(b3) 
0.032 0.05 0 -0.095 0.001 0.002 
Table 1: Regression coefficients, p-values, and adjusted R2 increases quantifying the relationships 
between the three independent variables and vulnerability to online misinformation. Adjusted R2 = 0.43. 
 
Identifying the most vulnerable populations may help gauge the impact of misinformation on election 
outcomes. Grinberg et al. identified older individuals and conservatives as particularly likely to engage 
with fake news content, compared to both centrists and left-leaning users (Grinberg et al., 2019). These 
characteristics correlate with those of voters who decided the presidential election in 2016 (Pew 
Research Center, 2018), leaving open the possibility that misinformation may have affected the election 
results. 
Our analysis of the correlation between misinformation sharing, political partisanship, and echo 
chambers paints a more nuanced picture. While right-leaning users are indeed the most likely to share 
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misinformation, left-leaning users are also significantly more vulnerable than moderates. In comparing 
these findings, one must keep in mind that the populations are different --- voters in the study by 
Grinberg et al. versus Twitter users in the present analysis. Causal links between political bias, motivated 
reasoning, exposure, sharing, and voting are yet to be fully explored. 
Methods 
Dataset 
We collected tweets from a 10% random sample of public posts in June 2017, through the Twitter API. 
Since we are interested in studying the population of active online news consumers, we selected all 
accounts that shared at least ten links from a set of news sources with known political valence (see 
“Partisanship” below). To focus on users who are vulnerable to misinformation, we further selected 
those who shared at least one link from a source labeled as low-quality. This second condition excludes 
5% of active right-leaning users and 30% of active left-leaning users. We then used the Twitter Friends 
API to build the follower network among the resulting set of users. Those with no friends in the network 
were further excluded, guaranteeing that we can compute partisanship and misinformation scores for 
each user and their friends.  
Finally, to ensure that we are analyzing human users and not social bots, we used the BotometerLite 
classifier (Yang et al., 2020) to remove likely bot accounts. This resulted in the removal of a little less 
than 1% of the accounts in the network. The user selection process resulted in 15,070 accounts that we 
analyzed. 
Partisanship 
To define partisanship, we track the sharing of links from web domains (e.g., cnn.com) associated with 
news sources of known political valence. For a source of political valence, we use a dataset compiled by 
Facebook (Bakshy et al., 2015), which consists of 500 news organizations. By examining the Facebook 
page of each news organization, the political valence score was computed based on the political self-
identification of the users who liked the page. The valence ranges from –1, indicating a left-leaning 
audience, to +1, indicating a right-leaning audience. 
We define the partisanship of each user 𝑢 as 𝑃# 	= 	𝑝(𝑠|𝑢)𝑣,, 
where 𝑝(𝑠|𝑢) is the fraction of links from source s that 𝑢 shares, derived from the Twitter data, and 𝑣, is 
the political valence of source 𝑠. In correlation and regression calculations, we take the absolute value |𝑃#| for left-leaning users. 
Misinformation 
To define misinformation, we considered a list of low-quality sources labeled by human judges 
(OpenSources). Although this list is no longer maintained, it was current at the time when our data was 
collected. While the list provides granular labels such as “fake news,” “conspiracy,” “junk science,” and 
so on, the number of shared links in our dataset including labeled sources was not sufficient to capture 
such granularity. Therefore, we combined all labeled sources into a single misinformation category. 
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We extracted all links shared by each user, irrespective of whether they were from legitimate news, 
misinformation, or any other source. Each user 𝑢's misinformation score 𝑀# is the fraction of all links 
they shared that were from sources labeled as misinformation.  
User Similarity 
To measure similarity between users, we construct the matrix of TF-IDF values for the user-domain 
matrix, with users analogous to documents (rows), and domains analogous to terms (columns). Thus, 
each user is represented by a vector of TF-IDF values indicating how strongly they are associated to each 
domain: 𝑇𝐹𝐼𝐷𝐹(𝑢, 𝑑𝑜𝑚) 	= 	𝑇𝐹(𝑢, 𝑑𝑜𝑚)	× 𝐼𝐷𝐹(𝑑𝑜𝑚), 
where 𝑢 is a user, 𝑑𝑜𝑚 is a domain, 𝑇𝐹(𝑢, 𝑑𝑜𝑚) is the frequency with which 𝑢 visits 𝑑𝑜𝑚, and  𝐼𝐷𝐹(𝑑𝑜𝑚) 	= 	𝑙𝑜𝑔 |9||:(;<=)|, 
with 𝑉(𝑑𝑜𝑚) being the subset of users who have visited domain 𝑑𝑜𝑚, out of the set of users 𝑈. 
To compute the similarity between two users, we take the dot product between their TF-IDF vectors. 
Finally, we take 𝑆# to be the average similarity between user 𝑢 and all of their friends. This measure 
quantifies how embedded a user is in their social network based on the content they and their friends 
share. A higher value indicates a homogeneous social network, which is one way to quantify an echo 
chamber. 
User Clustering 
To capture user clustering based on the followers network, we compute the clustering coefficient for 
each user as: 𝐶# 	= 	 B(#);C(#)(;C(#)	D	1)	D	2;E(#)	, 
where 𝑇(𝑢)is the number of directed triangles through the user node 𝑢, 𝑑F(𝑢) is the sum of in-degree 
and out-degree for 𝑢, and 𝑑G(𝑢) is the reciprocal degree of 𝑢 (Fagiolo, 2007). This measure quantifies 
how densely interconnected a user's social network is. A dense follower network is another way to 
quantify an echo chamber. 
Regression Analysis 
To compare the different factors that may contribute to a user's misinformation score, we used multiple 
linear regression. Since the regression was performed for right- and left-leaning users separately, we 
took the absolute values of the partisanship scores. In addition, we took the z-score transform of each 
variable. The resulting regression equation is: 𝑧I 	= 	 𝑏0 	+	𝑏1	𝑧|L| 	+	𝑏2	𝑧M 	+	𝑏3	𝑧N. 
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